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ORDER
Present: President HIGGINS; Vice-President AL-KHASAWNEH; Judges RANJEVA, SHI, KOROMA,
BUERGENTHAL, OWADA, SIMMA, ABRAHAM, KEITH, SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR, BENNOUNA,
SKOTNIKOV; Judges ad hoc TORRES BERNÁRDEZ, VINUESA; Registrar COUVREUR.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Articles 73
and 74 of the Rules of Court,
Makes the following Order:
1. Whereas by an Application filed in the Registry of the Court on 4 May 2006,
the Argentine Republic (hereinafter “Argentina”) instituted proceedings against the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay (hereinafter “Uruguay”) for the alleged breach by Uruguay of obligations
under the Statute of the River Uruguay, which was signed by Argentina and Uruguay on 26
February 1975 and entered into force on 18 September 1976 (hereinafter the “1975
Statute”); whereas such breach is said to arise from “the authorization, construction and
future commissioning of two pulp mills on the River Uruguay”, with reference in particu-
lar “to the effects of such activities on the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay and on
the areas affected by the river”;
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2. Whereas Argentina, in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court, relied in
its Application on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on the first
paragraph of Article 60 of the 1975 Statute, which provides that any dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of the 1975 Statute “which cannot be settled by direct
negotiations may be submitted by either Party to the International Court of Justice”;
3. Whereas on the basis of the statements of facts and law alleged in the
Application, Argentina requested the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:
“1. that Uruguay has breached the obligations incumbent upon it under the 1975
Statute and the other rules of international law to which that instrument refers, including
but not limited to:
(a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for the optimum and rational
utilization of the River Uruguay;
(b) the obligation of prior notification to CARU and to Argentina;
(c) the obligation to comply with the procedures prescribed in Chapter II of
the 1975 Statute;
(d  the obligation to take all necessary measures to preserve the aquatic
environment and prevent pollution and the obligation to protect biodiversity
and fisheries, including the obligation to prepare a full and objective
environmental impact study;
(e) the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of pollution and the
protection of biodiversity and of fisheries; and
2. that, by its conduct, Uruguay has engaged its international responsibility to
Argentina;
3. that Uruguay shall cease its wrongful conduct and comply scrupulously in future
with the obligations incumbent upon it; and
4. that Uruguay shall make full reparation for the injury caused by its breach of the
obligations incumbent upon it”;
4. Whereas by a request filed in the Registry on 4 May 2006, immediately after
the filing of the Application, Argentina, invoking Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and
Article 73 of the Rules of Court, and relying on the facts alleged in the Application,
requested that the Court indicate the following provisional measures:
“(a) pending the Court’s final judgment, Uruguay shall:
(i) suspend forthwith all authorizations for the construction of the CMB and
Orion mills;
(ii) take all necessary measures to suspend building work on the Orion mill;
and (iii) take all necessary measures to ensure that the suspension of buil-
ding work on the CMB mill is prolonged beyond 28 June 2006;
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(b) Uruguay shall co-operate in good faith with Argentina with a view to ensuring
the optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay in order to protect and preserve
the aquatic environment and to prevent its pollution;
(c) pending the Court’s final judgment, Uruguay shall refrain from taking any further
unilateral action with respect to construction of the CMB and Orion mills which does not
comply with the 1975 Statute and the rules of international law necessary for the latter’s
interpretation and application;
(d) Uruguay shall refrain from any other action which might aggravate or extend the
dispute which is the subject-matter of the present proceedings or render its settlement more
difficult”;
5. Whereas by an Order dated 13 July 2006, the Court, after hearing the Parties,
found “that the circumstances, as they [then] present[ed] themselves to the Court, [were]
not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures”; and whereas by an Order of the same day, the Court fixed 15
January 2007 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Argentina and 20 July
2007 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Uruguay;
6. Whereas on 29 November 2006, Uruguay, referring to the pending case and
invoking Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 73 of the Rules of Court,
submitted in turn to the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures;
7. Whereas in this request Uruguay stated that “[t]he provisional measures …
requested are urgently needed to protect the rights of Uruguay that are at issue in these
proceedings from imminent and irreparable injury, and to prevent the aggravation of the
present dispute”;
8. Whereas Uruguay explained that since 20 November 2006, “[o]rganized groups
of Argentine citizens have blockaded a vital international bridge over the Uruguay River,
shutting off commercial and tourist travel from Argentina to Uruguay”, that “the blockade
… is planned to continue without interruption for at least the next three months”, that is
to say during the whole of the South American summer tourist season, and that the blockade
“will deprive Uruguay of hundreds of millions of dollars in foregone trade and tourism”;
whereas Uruguay maintained that “[t]he economic damage suffered by Uruguay to date as
a result of the blockades has [already] been enormous”; whereas it pointed out that the
leaders of the blockade “are planning to extend the blockades beyond the bridges to the
river itself ‘to prevent river traffic with supplies for Botnia’”; whereas Uruguay added that
it is not the first time that Argentina has unlawfully allowed the blockade of international
bridges; whereas it recalled that Argentina previously “allowed a similar blockade by the
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same Argentine citizen groups” for the purpose of forcing “Uruguay to terminate construction
of the cellulose plants” and specified that “[t]hat blockade was imposed during and beyond
the last summer tourist season, between 8 December 2005 and 20 March 2006, and again
from 5 April to 2 May”;
9. Whereas Uruguay contended that “[t]he stated purpose of the blockade is to
compel Uruguay to accede to Argentina’s demand that it permanently end construction of
the Botnia cellulose plant that is the subject of this litigation, and to prevent the plant from
ever coming into operation”;
10. Whereas in the request for the indication of provisional measures, Uruguay
maintained that “the Government of Argentina has not taken any action against the new
blockade, and it appears that it has no intention to use the means at its disposal as a
sovereign State to stop it”; whereas Uruguay thus argued that “Argentina’s international
responsibility for [the] blockades. resulting from its allowance of them, its acquiescence in
them, and its failure to act against them. is manifest”;
11. Whereas according to Uruguay, the right which it seeks to safeguard by its
request is “the right to carry on with the construction and operation of the Botnia plant in
conformity with the environmental standards established under the bi-national agreement
known as the Estatuto del Río Uruguay” pending the Court’s adjudication on the merits of
the case;
12. Whereas Uruguay further claimed that it “has a right to have [the present]
dispute resolved by the Court pursuant to Article 60 [of the 1975 Statute], rather than by
Argentina’s unilateral acts of an extrajudicial and coercive nature”; whereas Uruguay termed
Argentina’s conduct “a contempt of court”; whereas Uruguay submitted “that Argentina’s
conduct constitutes a flagrant violation of its obligations as a Party to proceedings in this
Court, which require it to refrain from any action or omission that might irreparably
harm the rights claimed by Uruguay that the Court has been called upon to adjudicate”;
whereas Uruguay further contended that Argentina’s conduct “contravenes the Court’s 13
July 2006 injunction to the Parties to ‘refrain from any actions which might render more
difficult the resolution of the present dispute’”;
13. Whereas at the conclusion of its request Uruguay asked the Court to indicate
the following provisional measures:
“While awaiting the final judgment of the Court, Argentina
(i) shall take all reasonable and appropriate steps at its disposal to prevent or
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end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and Argentina, including
the blockading of bridges and roads between the two States;
(ii) shall abstain from any measure that might aggravate, extend or make more
difficult the settlement of this dispute; and (iii) shall abstain from any other
measure that might prejudice the rights of Uruguay in dispute before the
Court”;
14. Whereas the last paragraph of Uruguay’s request reads as follows:
“It is Uruguay’s strong preference that this matter be resolved diplomatically and
amicably between the two Parties. What Uruguay seeks is Argentina’s agreement to end the
current blockade and prevent any further blockades, and its fulfilment of that agreement. If
Argentina will make such a commitment, Uruguay will accept it in good faith and will no
longer have a need for judicial intervention, or for the provisional measures requested
herein. In such circumstances, Uruguay would be pleased to withdraw this request”;
15. Whereas immediately upon receiving the text of the request for the indication
of provisional measures, the Registrar transmitted a certified copy thereof to the Agent of
the Republic of Argentina, in accordance with Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas the Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations
of the filing of the request;
16. Whereas by letters dated 29 November 2006, the Registrar informed the
Parties that the Court, in accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court,
had fixed 18 December 2006 as the date for the opening of the oral proceedings;
17. Whereas, on 14 December 2006, Uruguay transmitted to the Court a volume
of documents concerning the request for the indication of provisional measures entitled
“Observations of Uruguay”; and whereas a copy of these documents was immediately sent
to Argentina;
18. Whereas, on 18 December 2006, before the opening of oral proceedings,
Argentina transmitted to the Court a volume of documents concerning the request for the
indication of provisional measures; and whereas a copy of these documents was immediately
sent to Uruguay;
19. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 18 and 19 December 2006 in
accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral observations on the
request for the indication of provisional measures were presented by the following
representatives of the Parties:
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On behalf of Uruguay: H.E. Mr. Héctor Gros Espiell, Agent,
Mr. Alan Boyle,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli;
On behalf of Argentina: H.E. Ms Susana Myrta Ruiz Cerutti, Agent,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen,
Mr. Alain Pellet;
*
* *
20. Whereas, at the hearings, Argentina challenged the jurisdiction of the Court
to indicate the provisional measures requested by Uruguay; whereas it contended that
“[r]ecognition of the Court’s jurisdiction over the case brought before it by Argentina does
not imply that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with any procedural incident such as the
request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Uruguay”; whereas Argen-
tina contended that provisional measures can be indicated by the Court only if there is “a
direct legal link … between, on the one hand, the provisional measures requested and, on
the other, the claims filed in the Application, which define the subject of the case” (emphasis
in the original); whereas it argued that the request for the indication of provisional measures
has “no link with the Statute of the River Uruguay, the only international instrument
serving as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case concerning Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay”, nor, a fortiori, with Argentina’s Application by which the case was brought
before the Court; and whereas it explained that, had Uruguay addressed the same requests
to the Court “by means of a fresh application based on Article 60 of the 1975 Statute …
the Court [would have declined] jurisdiction, there being no jurisdictional link”, inasmuch
as those requests are completely unrelated to the 1975 Statute;
21. Whereas Argentina contended that the real purpose of Uruguay’s request is to
obtain the removal of the roadblocks; whereas it emphasized that none of the rights potentially
affected by the aforesaid roadblocks, that is the right to freedom of transport and to freedom
of commerce between the two States, are rights “governed by the Statute of the River Uru-
guay”; whereas it stipulated that those rights are guaranteed by the Treaty of Asunción which
established the Southern Common Market (hereinafter “Mercosur”); whereas Argentina
indicated that Uruguay had in fact already seised a Mercosur ad hoc Tribunal in relation to the
roadblocks and that that tribunal “handed down its decision on the case on 6 September last
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… [and] its decision is final and binding and constitutes res judicata with respect to the
Parties”; whereas it noted that Mercosur’s dispute settlement system “rule[s] out the possibility
of applying to any other forum” once a specific course of action has been selected and that,
having had recourse to the Mercosur procedure, Uruguay “cannot today back down”; and
whereas it added that Uruguay, in its request to the Court, is seeking “to obtain a new decision
on the same facts that have already been decided” and “on an issue which is neither within the
jurisdiction of the Court nor part of the case that Argentina submitted [to it]”, thus constituting
“an abuse of forum on the part of Uruguay”;
*
22. Whereas Uruguay denied that its request for the indication of provisional
measures seeks to obtain from the Court condemnation of the unlawfulness of the blocking
of international roads and bridges connecting Argentina to Uruguay under general
international law or under the rules of the Treaty of Asunción; whereas it stated that it “is
fully aware that such breaches … fall outside of the jurisdiction of this Court inasmuch as
they are not covered by the Statute of the River Uruguay” and that it “follows that the
arbitration clause in Article 60 of the Statute simply cannot be invoked in that regard”;
whereas it indicated, however, that the roadblocks constitute “unlawful acts” which “violate
and threaten irreparable harm to the very rights defended by Uruguay” in the present case;
whereas it added that “[t]he blocking of international roads and bridges … is a matter
directly, intimately and indissociably related to the subject-matter of the case before the
Court”; and whereas it contended that the Court “most certainly has jurisdiction in respect
of breaches by Argentina of its obligations as a Party to this dispute”;
23. Whereas Uruguay further disputed that the measures it took within the frame-
work of the Mercosur institutions had any bearing whatsoever on the Court’s jurisdiction
to hear its request for the indication of provisional measures; whereas it explained that the
decision of the ad hoc Tribunal of 6 September 2006 concerned different roadblocks.
established at another time and with a different purpose. to those referred to by its request
for provisional measures; whereas it makes clear that it has not instituted any further
proceedings within Mercosur’s dispute settlement mechanisms with respect to the existing
roadblocks and that those institutions do not in any case have the jurisdiction to address
the rights concerned by the proceedings before the Court and which Uruguay is in this
case seeking to protect;
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*
24. Whereas in dealing with a request for provisional measures the Court need
not finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case but will not indicate
such measures unless there is, prima facie, a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be established; (see, for example, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New
Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional Measures,
Order of 10 July 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 241, para. 58; Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, para. 57);
whereas that is so whether the request for the indication of provisional measures is made
by the applicant or by the respondent in the proceedings on the merits;
25. Whereas in establishing the Court’s prima facie jurisdiction to deal with the
merits of the case, the question of the nature and extent of the rights for which protection
is being sought in the request for the indication of provisional measures has no bearing;
whereas that latter question will only be addressed once the Court’s prima facie jurisdiction
over the merits of the case has been established;
26. Whereas in its Order of 13 July 2006 the Court, noting that both “Parties [were]
in agreement that the Court has jurisdiction with regard to the rights to which Article 60 of the
1975 Statute applies”, already concluded that “it [had] prima facie jurisdiction under Article
60 of the 1975 Statute to deal with the merits [of the case]” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, para. 59);
27. Whereas, in the course of the current proceedings, the Parties have expressed
diverging views as to whether Uruguay’s request for the indication of provisional measures
aims at protecting rights which fall within the scope of the 1975 Statute and thus within
the prima facie jurisdiction which the Court has to deal with the merits of the case;
whereas the link between the alleged rights the protection of which is the subject of the
provisional measures being sought, and the subject of the proceedings before the Court on
the merits of the case has to be examined;
28. Whereas Article 41 of the Court’s Statute authorizes it “to indicate … any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either
party”; and whereas the rights of the respondent are not dependent solely upon the way in
which the applicant formulates its application;
29. Whereas the Court finds that any right Uruguay may have to continue the
construction and to begin the commissioning of the Botnia plant in conformity with the
provisions of the 1975 Statute, pending a final decision by the Court, effectively constitutes
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a claimed right in the present case, which may in principle be protected by the indication
of provisional measures; and whereas Uruguay’s claimed right to have the merits of the
present case resolved by the Court under Article 60 of the 1975 Statute also has a connection
with the subject of the proceedings on the merits initiated by Argentina and may in principle
be protected by the indication of provisional measures;
30. Whereas the Court concludes that the rights which Uruguay invokes in, and
seeks to protect by, its request (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) have a sufficient connection
with the merits of the case for the purposes of the current proceedings; whereas Article 60
of the 1975 Statute may thus be applicable to the rights which Uruguay invokes in the
present proceedings; whereas the rights invoked by Uruguay before the Mercosur ad hoc
Tribunal are different from those that it seeks to have protected in the present case; and
whereas it follows that the Court has jurisdiction to address the present request for provi-
sional measures;
*
* *
31. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures under Article
41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve the respective rights of each party to the
proceedings “[p]ending the final decision”, providing that such measures are justified to
prevent irreparable prejudice to the rights which are the subject of the dispute;
32. Whereas that power of the Court to indicate provisional measures can be
exercised only if there is an urgent necessity to prevent irreparable prejudice to such
rights, before the Court has given its final decision (see, for example, Passage through
the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991,
I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23; Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic
of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measure, Order of 17 June 2003, I.C.J. Reports
2003, p. 107, para. 22);
33. Whereas the Court thus has to consider whether the existence of such urgent
necessity to prevent irreparable prejudice to the rights which are the subject of the present
case has been shown in the current proceedings;
* *
34. Whereas the Court will now turn to the first provisional measure which Uru-
guay requests, namely that Argentina “shall take all reasonable and appropriate steps at its
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disposal to prevent or end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and Argentina,
including the blockading of bridges and roads between the two States”;
*
35. Whereas Uruguay explained that roadblocks had been installed on all of the
bridges linking Uruguay to Argentina; whereas it specified that the Fray Bentos bridge,
which normally carries 91 per cent of Uruguay’s exports to Argentina, was subject to a
complete and uninterrupted blockade; whereas it added that the two other bridges linking
the two countries “ha[d] at times been closed” and that there was a real risk of them being
blocked permanently; whereas it stressed the fact that these roadblocks had an extremely
serious impact on Uruguay’s economy and on its tourist industry; whereas Uruguay recalled
that “the outcome which the blockaders wish to impose on Uruguay by taking to the streets
is the same as that pursued by Argentina in seising [the] Court”, that is, “to compel
Uruguay to halt construction of the Botnia plant”; and whereas it believed that this shared
goal explains the decision taken “at the highest level, [by the Argentine Government,] to
remain inactive, taking care not to prevent the blockades and not to end them”;
36. Whereas Uruguay further stated that, if it were obliged to halt the Botnia
project in order to protect its tourist industry and its trade, as a consequence of the
pressure exerted upon it, the project would be lost in its entirety and the prejudice suffered
would therefore be irreparable; and whereas it also contended that the provisional measures
it has requested the Court to indicate are urgent in view of the fact that Argentina’s coercive
manoeuvres are already under way and might be aggravated;
37. Whereas Uruguay argued that “by its behaviour in encouraging the blockades,
[Argentina] is attempting … to undermine the Court’s ability to render effective justice
between the Parties” and that “[i]t is in that very direct and immediate sense that Uruguay’s
right to proceed with construction and authorization of the plant is at serious risk of
irreparable prejudice now, not merely in the future”; whereas, according to Uruguay, in
evaluating the urgency of the provisional measures requested, the Court should take into
account the “urgency or imminence … of the activity causing the harm, not necessarily the
harm itself ”; whereas it maintained that with the blockades “Argentina has initiated a
trend that is intended to result in irreparable harm to the very substance of the rights in
dispute” and that, accordingly, “it is the blockades that present the urgent threat, not …
[the] impact they may eventually have on the Botnia plant”;
*
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38. Whereas Argentina disputed the version of the facts presented by Uruguay; whereas
it explained that the issue is the blockade of roads in Argentine territory and not of an
international bridge and that such roadblocks are “sporadic, partial and geographically localized”;
whereas it claimed that those blockades have had no impact on either tourism or trade between
the two countries, which, on the contrary, have both shown growth over the first three quarters
of 2006; whereas it submitted that the aforesaid roadblocks “have not had the slightest effect
on the construction of the pulp mills”, which “has continued at its own pace” and Argentina
indicates in this respect that “the Orion mill is at 70 per cent of the planned construction”; and
whereas it insisted on the fact that it has never encouraged the roadblocks, nor provided the
blockaders with any support, and that it “applies an active policy of persuasion but not of
repression to discourage that type of social movement”;
39. Whereas Argentina further submitted that in any case the partial blocking of
roads in Argentina is not capable of causing irreparable prejudice to the rights which will be
the subject of the decision of the Court on the merits of the case, and that there is no urgency
to the measures which Uruguay has requested the Court to indicate; whereas it claimed that
“[t]he possible impact of these sporadic protests on the Uruguayan economy and tourist industry
… has no factual or legal bearing on the River Uruguay, the quality of its water or the construction
of the Botnia pulp mill” and that “Uruguay has provided no evidence … that the disputed
construction works have been affected” by those protests; whereas it contended moreover that
any damage resulting from the interruption of the construction works “would be perfectly
‘reparable’” and that the “right to a judgment … can … be infringed only in the event of
discontinuance”, of which there is no question in the present case;
*
40. Whereas the Court, having heard the arguments of the Parties, is of the view
that, notwithstanding the blockades, the construction of the Botnia plant progressed
significantly since the summer of 2006 with two further authorizations being granted and
that it is now well advanced; whereas the construction of the plant is thus continuing;
41. Whereas the Court, without addressing whether the roadblocks may have
caused or may continue to cause damage to the Uruguayan economy, is not convinced, in
view of the foregoing, that those blockades risk prejudicing irreparably the rights which
Uruguay claims in the present case from the 1975 Statute as such;
42. Whereas, moreover, it has not been shown that were there such a risk of
prejudice to the rights claimed by Uruguay in this case, it is imminent;
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43. Whereas the Court consequently finds that the circumstances of the case are
not such as to require the indication of the first provisional measure requested by Uru-
guay, to “prevent or end the interruption of transit” between the two States and inter alia
“the blockading of [the] bridges and roads” linking them;
* *
44. Whereas the Court will now turn to the remaining provisional measures which
Uruguay requests, namely that Argentina “shall abstain from any measure that might
aggravate, extend or make more difficult the settlement of this dispute; and shall abstain
from any other measure that might prejudice the rights of Uruguay in dispute before the
Court”;
*
45. Whereas Uruguay maintained that the second provisional measure is necessary
to prevent the “aggravation or extension of the [present] dispute” or to prevent rendering
its settlement more difficult; whereas Uruguay observed in this regard that “a party to
litigation before the Court, even one that has lost a provisional measures application, has
a duty to respect the decision of the Court and to refrain from taking or permitting
measures which are calculated to undermine the due administration of justice”; whereas it
emphasized that the Court has already decided in the past that it had the “power to indicate,
if need be, such provisional measures as may conduce to the due administration of justice”;
whereas Uruguay claimed that “[a]n order can be made to prevent aggravation of the
dispute even where the Court has found that there is no threat of irreparable damage to the
rights in dispute”; whereas Uruguay submitted that, in casu, “the blockade of trade and
traffic across the bridges over the River Uruguay amounts to an aggravation of the dispute
which threatens the due administration of justice”;
46. Whereas Uruguay, in support of the third provisional measure it requests,
asserted that according to the Court’s jurisprudence, pendente lite “the Court’s judgment
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the matters in issue before
the Court”, but that Argentina’s conduct aimed “to compel Uruguay to submit at once,
without waiting for [the] judgment on the merits, to the claims submitted by Argentina to
the Court” and, in particular, to force it “to halt the construction [of the Botnia plant] …
when the [Court’s] Order of last July refused to enjoin such a halt” and that Argentina is
“in reality seeking to obtain by anticipation and de facto what it could only obtain at this
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juncture by means of a judgment in its favour, on the merits, in other words exclusively
through a judgment recognizing its alleged ‘right of veto’ as to the construction …”; whereas
Uruguay moreover maintained that in conformity with the 1975 Statute and according to
the Court’s Order of 13 July 2006, it has the right to proceed with the construction and
authorization of the Botnia plant pending the hearing on the merits and that this right
should thus be protected by the Court’s Order; whereas it added that Argentina’s conduct
“undermines the authority of the Court and prejudices the final decision [it is] to give
regarding whether or not such construction is permitted under the 1975 Statute in spite of
Argentina’s disagreement”; and whereas Uruguay concluded that the Court should order
that Argentina “shall abstain from any other measure that might prejudice the rights of
Uruguay in dispute before the Court”;
*
47. Whereas Argentina maintained that no risk of aggravation or extension of the
dispute exists given that “no right that Uruguay could invoke before the Court in respect of
the dispute before it has been infringed”; whereas it further argued that neither the 1975
Statute nor the Order rendered by the Court on 13 July 2006 give Uruguay a “right to
continue with the construction of the Botnia plant” capable of benefiting from any protection
by the Court at this stage of proceedings; whereas it specified that by that Order the Court
simply “held that at the provisional measures stage it did not have to consider the issue of
whether Uruguay could implement its project in the absence of agreement between the
Parties or, failing such agreement, pending settlement of the dispute by the Court”, but
that the Order did not create “any new right for Uruguay”; whereas, while Argentina does
not deny that Uruguay has the right to have the Court settle the dispute between the Parties
over the pulp mills, it noted that “[n]othing in its conduct infringes Uruguay’s procedural
rights” and that “nothing and no one is endangering Uruguay’s rights to continue the
present proceedings, to deploy all its grounds of defence and to obtain a decision of [the]
Court with binding force”;
48. Whereas, finally, Argentina submitted that in the absence of any link to the
subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court, should the Court decide not to indicate
the first provisional measure, the second and third provisional measures requested by
Uruguay cannot be indicated independently from the first provisional measure;
*
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49. Whereas the Court has on several occasions issued provisional measures
directing the parties not to take any actions which could aggravate or extend the
dispute or render more difficult its settlement (see, for example, United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December
1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 21, para. 47 (B); Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugos-
lavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 24, para. 52 (B); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996,
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 24, para. 49 (1); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 July
2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 129, para. 47(1)); whereas in those cases provisional
measures other than measures directing the parties not to take actions to aggravate or
extend the dispute or to render more difficult its settlement were also indicated;
50. Whereas the Court has not found that at present there is an imminent risk of
irreparable prejudice to the rights of Uruguay in dispute before it, caused by the blockades
of the bridges and roads linking the two States (see paragraphs 41-43 above); whereas the
Court therefore considers that the blockades themselves do not justify the indication of
the second provisional measure requested by Uruguay, in the absence of the conditions for
the Court to indicate the first provisional measure;
51. Whereas, for the aforementioned reasons, the Court cannot indicate the third
provisional measure requested by Uruguay either;
* *
52. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures by Uruguay in
its entirety thus cannot be upheld;
* *
53. Whereas the Court reiterates its call to the Parties made in its Order of 13 July
2006 “to fulfil their obligations under international law”, “to implement in good faith the
consultation and co-operation procedures provided for by the 1975 Statute, with CARU
[Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay] constituting the envisaged forum in
this regard”, and “to refrain from any actions which might render more difficult the resolution
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of the present dispute” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional
Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, para. 82);
*
* *
54. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges
the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any
questions relating to the admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves;
and whereas it leaves unaffected the right of Argentina and of Uruguay to submit arguments
in respect of those questions;
55. Whereas this decision also leaves unaffected the right of Uruguay to submit in
the future a fresh request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 75,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, based on new facts;
*
* *
56. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Court, are not
such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures.
IN FAVOUR: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi,
Koroma, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna,
Skotnikov; Judge ad hoc Vinuesa;
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace
Palace, The Hague, this twenty-third day of January, two thousand and seven, in three
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted
to the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the Eastern Republic
of Uruguay, respectively.
(Signed) Rosalyn HIGGINS,
President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
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Registrar.
Judges KOROMA and BUERGENTHAL append declarations to the Order of the Court;
Judge ad hoc TORRES BERNÁRDEZ appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the
Court.
(Initialled) R.H.
(Initialled) Ph.C.
